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SOMBER REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
The Military and Paramilitary Activities case' deepens the gloom already surrounding the two forms of the International Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Neither Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, which confers general compulsory jurisdiction upon the Court in cases of reciprocal state declarations, nor that part of Article 36(1) which vestsjurisdiction when treaties so provide 2 has been particularly successful in recent practice. No one denies that the ICJ has served a useful, if occasional, role when it has heard and decided cases voluntarily submitted by then-willing states pursuant to the specially conferred provision of Article 36(1). What is in question is the utility of the all too many recent cases where the Court has taken jurisdiction pursuant to the compulsory provisions of its Statute and then has been, to one degree or another, disregarded.
Since 5 There is always the theoretical possibility of enforcing an ICJ judgment against a recalcitrant state by having the Security Council take action,'" but in practice this has not occurred. 7 What gain is there in disregarded compulsory jurisdiction cases?
Almost three decades ago, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht concluded that the Court was much more useful as a vehicle for developing the rules of international law than it was as a means of maintaining international peace.' 8 Certainly, there is grist for many legal mills in the language of even ineffective compulsory jurisdiction cases, Military and Paramilitary Activities being no exception. The majority opinion alone has new and very illuminating language about, inter alia, nonappearing parties,' 9 the proof of facts in international law, 2 " the relationship of treaty law and customary international law, 2 ' and aggression and self-defense.
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There may also be some public relations value in otherwise ineffective compulsory jurisdiction cases. The United States, for example, sought to use the Diplomatic and Consular Staffcase as a means of maintaining "support for the American position by the vast majority of nations on earth, 23 although it is doubtful the ICJ was ultimately so useful in freeing the hostages as were the economic sanctions taken against Iran. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under ajudgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. COURT 4-5 (1958 Against such gains must be weighed the loss in respect for the ICJ when it acts like a court in name but not in deed. These cases of compulsory jurisdiction display the Court in its weakest and least effectual role. In these circumstances, the ICJ does not truly adjudicate disputes, if "adjudication" has anything to do with a decision that actually settles a matter.
Plainly, much of the blame for the loss in respect for the Court rests on the shoulders of noncomplying defendant states that are failing to observe Article 94(1) of the Charter. Some fault, too, lies with applicant states that use the Court as a public forum when they know that the ICJ has little practical chance of effectively resolving a dispute. Realistically, it may be time for us to recognize that, given the present context of world politics, the compulsory jurisdiction provisions of the ICJ Statute are simply overoptimistic and that the surer and better role for the Court is in the adjudication of cases jointly submitted by willing states. It may be time, too, for the ICJ to contemplate a strategic retreat and in cases of compulsory jurisdiction to be willing to contemplate a doctrine of judicial restraint when it seems unlikely that its decisions will be respected in practice. In the give-and-take of international relations, and in the jurisprudence of the International Court, these elements have been compressed into two: consistent state practice and Hudson's third element, the opin juris.
2 In
